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Global Administrative Law: 
The View from Basel
Michael S. Barr* and Geoffrey P. Miller**
Abstract
International law-making by sub-national actors and regulatory networks of bureaucrats
has come under attack as lacking in accountability and legitimacy. Global administrative
law is emerging as an approach to understanding what international organizations and
national governments do, or ought to do, to respond to the perceived democracy deficit in
international law-making. This article examines the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, a club of central bankers who meet to develop international banking capital
standards and to develop supervisory guidance. The Basel Committee embodies many of the
attributes that critics of international law-making lament. A closer examination, however,
reveals a structure of global administrative law inherent in the Basel process that could be a
model for international law-making with greater accountability and legitimacy.
1 Transnational Norms and Global Administrative Law
The increasing integration that characterizes the current period of globalization has
sparked a heated debate about the role that law should, or could, play in the process.1
Some attack international ‘law-making’ by sub-national actors and ‘regulatory net-
works’ of bureaucrats on the ground that these processes lack accountability and
legitimacy.2 ‘New sovereigntists’3 argue that customary international law improperly
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. We would like to thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, Steve
Croley, Daniel Halberstam, Jerry Hawke, Robert Howse, Nico Howson, Kyle Logue, Nina Mendelson, Richard
Primus, Dan Tarullo, and Mark West for comments on an earlier draft, and Aimee Mangan, Kasia Solon and
the University of Michigan Law School Library staff for research assistance. Email: msbarr@umich.edu
** William T. and Stuyvesant P. Comfort Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Email:
geoffrey.miller@nyu.edu
1 See Barr and Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Law & Development: Introduction and Overview’, 26 Michigan J
Int’l L (2005) 1.
2 For a description of the rise of regulatory networks, see A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (2004). But
see Anderson, ‘Book Review: Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance
Through Global Governance Networks (reviewing A New World Order)’, 118 Harvard L Rev (2005)
1255 (arguing that networks are not new and do not undermine state power).
3 Spiro, ‘The New Sovereigntists’, 79 Foreign Affairs (2000) 9.
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displaces national arrangements of authority for law-making at the state and federal
level.4 Others call for enhanced public participation and transparency in treaty-based
regimes such as the WTO.5 Still others criticize the rise of international networks that
operate seemingly without any form of legitimacy or accountability.6
In response to the perceived ‘democracy deficit’ in international law-making, Benedict
Kingsbury and his colleagues are attempting to build a scholarly agenda under the
rubric ‘Global Administrative Law’.7 By that term, Kingsbury and his co-authors
mean ‘the structures, procedures and normative standards for regulatory decision-
making . . . that are applicable to formal intergovernmental regulatory bodies; to
informal intergovernmental regulatory networks, to regulatory decisions of national
governments where these are part of or constrained by an international intergovern-
mental regime; and to hybrid public-private or private transnational bodies’.8 The
basic contention is that there is, or ought to be, a global administrative law that gov-
erns the conduct of international entities and national governments in international
matters, and that in some way responds to the normative desire, shared in many
ways with domestic administrative law, for accountability, fairness, protection of
individual rights, and some sense of democratic decision-making.9
This article joins the search for global administrative law, focusing specifically on
the activities of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an institution that meets
under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. The
Committee is composed of representatives of the central banks and supervisory
authorities of the G-10 countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) and Luxembourg. Launched to coordinate responses to an international
banking crisis in 1974 stemming from the failure of Herstatt Bank in Germany, the
Committee evolved into a forum for harmonizing national supervision and capital
standards for banks.10 Over the past two decades, the Basel Committee has developed
progressively more sophisticated guidelines for capital adequacy in depository institu-
tions. The Committee’s 1988 Accord (‘Basel I’) was initially intended to govern only
4 Goldsmith and Bradley, ‘Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position’, 110 Harvard L Rev (1997) 815.
5 Howse and Nicolaidis, ‘Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?’,
16 Governance (2003) 73; Howse, ‘How to Begin to Think About the Democratic Deficit at the WTO’, in
S. Griller (ed.), International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns: New Challenges for the Inter-
national Legal Order (2003), at 79; Howse, ‘Membership and Its Privileges: The WTO, Civil Society, and
the Amicus Brief Controversy’, 9 ELJ (2003) 496.
6 Slaughter, ‘Global Governance Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy’,
in K.-H. Ladeur (ed.), Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (2004), at 133.
7 Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 68 Law and Contempo-
rary Problems (2005) 15. For a discussion of different meanings of this democracy deficit, see Howse,
‘How to Begin to Think’, supra note 5.
8 Kingsbury, supra note 7, at 5.
9 See generally ibid.
10 For a description of the Basel Committee, see Zaring, ‘Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in Interna-
tional Administration’, 5 Chicago J Int’l L (2005) 547.
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internationally active banks in the G-10 and Luxembourg. It is fair to say that Basel I
is one of the most successful international regulatory initiatives ever attempted. It
was adopted as domestic law by the G-10 nations, applied by them to all of their
banks, and then promulgated by over 100 countries around the world although
implementation varies widely from country to country. The Committee is currently
engaged in a long-running process to revise the 1988 Accord, and has proposed a
complex capital standard (Basel II) running at hundreds of pages.
The Basel Committee is perhaps the most important example of a transgovernmental
regulatory network that exercises vast powers, seemingly without any form of
democratic accountability. Imagine a club of central bankers meeting secretly in one of
Switzerland’s wealthiest cities, known for its discretion, its iconic graphic design school,
and boring bars. The members of the Basel Committee develop regulations governing
the very lifeblood of domestic economies in ways that expand the reach of distant, unac-
countable bureaucrats. Legislators may find themselves out of the loop and interna-
tional banks can find no escape from burdensome rules. No wonder sober
commentators such as former U.S. House Financial Services Committee ranking mem-
ber John LaFalce has called the Basel process ‘fundamentally flawed’ and ‘dangerous’11
and former Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Chairman William Isaac
described it as a ‘runaway train’.12 And the reach of the Basel Committee extends bey-
ond the economies of its member countries. Developing countries face pressures from
the market, the IMF and the World Bank to adopt the Basel standards even though they
are not members of the club. For those reasons, some have pointed to the Basel Commit-
tee as the ‘leading suspect’ of a transgovernmental agency ‘on the loose’.13
A closer examination, however, reveals a structure of global administrative law
inherent in the Basel process that could be a model for international rule-making with
greater accountability and legitimacy. While far from ideal, the Basel process has come
a long way from the purely closed ‘club’ model of its origins, and demonstrates the pos-
sibility for enhanced accountability and legitimacy in international regulation. At the
international level, the Basel committee has recently engaged in a relatively open pro-
cess akin to a notice and comment rule-making in developing international capital
standards, and has improved its transparency. At the domestic level, central banks and
national bank regulators have enmeshed the Basel standards in the domestic notice
and comment rule-making process, enhancing the legitimacy of the international pro-
cess through local procedural protections. Moreover, international regulatory proc-
esses, including Basel, can in some instances help to reinforce, rather than undermine,
domestic norms of accountability and legitimacy, particularly in countries where inside
elites block reforms and prevent transparent domestic regulatory processes from occur-
ring. The interaction among these international, transnational and domestic adminis-
trative procedures generates norms of behaviour and structures of practice that can
help to promote accountability and legitimacy in the global administrative space.
11 LaFalce, ‘Basel II Plan is a Crisis in the Making’, American Banker, 11 Mar. 2005, 11.
12 Isaac, ‘Somebody Must Stop the Runaway Basel II Train’, American Banker, 1 Mar. 2005, 2A.
13 See Slaughter, supra note 6.
18 EJIL 17 (2006), 15–46 
The article explores how accountability and legitimacy can be furthered through
the interplay among international, transnational and national modes of administra-
tive law.14 Neither a sole focus on national administrative law nor exclusive reliance
on new mechanisms within international organizations is sufficient. In some ways
the Basel process is special because it involves the development of non-binding inter-
national standards that are adopted at the national level in a highly technical field.
Yet we argue that a transnational process of norm transmission in administrative law
can further accountability and legitimacy across a range of institutional contexts.
2 Basel and Globalization’s Critics
Why look to Basel to find global administrative law? In many respects, it is a counter-
intuitive choice: the Basel Committee can be held out as a prime example of ‘regula-
tors gone amok’ if regulators’ interests diverge significantly from national govern-
ments and citizens. This section explains the aspects of the Basel Committee that
could be most problematic from the vantage-point of the legitimacy and accountabil-
ity of transnational regulation. The remaining sections, by contrast, suggest ways in
which the Basel process has sought to overcome problems of legitimacy and account-
ability in ways that contribute to the emergence of global administrative law.
A Central Bankers’ Club
The Basel Committee is composed of the central bankers (and other bank regulators)
of the world’s most industrialized nations. The Committee is a ‘club’ by design – small,
homogeneous, and insular – designed to reach agreement quickly and act flexibly.
Let’s begin with its participants: central bankers in the relevant nations (and more
generally) are intended to be relatively insulated from both executive and congres-
sional control domestically. In the United States, presidential control over the Federal
Reserve Board is asserted at the time of nomination of the Chairman or members, and
then is assiduously disclaimed in the interests of preserving the Board’s market credi-
bility to conduct monetary policy.15 Congressional control extends to the confirma-
tion process, and then periodic hearings on both monetary and banking policy. The
strong lever of appropriations does not apply because the Reserve Board is funded
through interest on its security holdings, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC) through examination fees paid by banks.
Other central bankers are similarly insulated, to some degree, from domestic modes
of political accountability. As Willem Buiter has written, the European Central Bank
is ‘typical of a central banking tradition that was, until recently, dominant across the
14 By transnational law, following Jessup, we mean ‘all law which regulates actions or events that tran-
scend national frontiers’, including the law of nations, private international law, and national law as it
relates to activities beyond the nation itself: see P.C. Jessup, Transnational Law (1956).
15 But see Strauss, ‘The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch’, 84
Columbia L Rev (1984) 573, at 589–591 (arguing that presidential control over independent agencies is
preserved through the President’s ‘special ties’ with agency heads).
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world, which views central banking as a sacred, quasi-mystical vocation, a cult
whose priests perform the holy sacraments far from the prying eyes of the non-
initiates’.16 That is, this is a club of officials engaged in transnational regulation
whose domestic accountability and legitimacy is subject to question from the start.
In no country is central bank independence absolute, and with good reason:
nations sometimes need to act in extraordinary ways in extraordinary times, and
democratic legitimacy demands that central banks operate according to the legisla-
tive parameters established for them.17 Their legitimacy is rooted in their legislative
creation and objectives, and accountability is pursued in a formal sense through
executive appointment as well as congressional oversight, and in an informal sense
through professional standards, transparency and reasoned decision-making that
permit outside peer review and press scrutiny, and other means.18 But in the
advanced economies, and increasingly in the developing world, central bankers enjoy
high levels of political independence. Independence tends to promote stability in mon-
etary policy.19 Stability at low rates of inflation reaps benefits both in fostering
internal growth and in attracting foreign capital. Yet this independence heightens
concerns about the legitimacy and accountability of central bankers both in the con-
duct of monetary policy and in ancillary functions, including bank regulation.20
In addition, because Basel operates in many respects as an informal club, the activ-
ities of the Basel Committee may be opaque and difficult to explain to the public. The
informality of the Basel process serves to diminish transparency and may increase the
potential for capture by special interests, particularly the largest, internationally act-
ive financial institutions. The concern that such institutions may have captured the
Basel process is heightened by the fact that the final Basel II Accord provides that
financial institutions can engage in a form of self-regulation by relying on internal
risk measurements in determining capital standards, and the fact that such internal
risk measurements themselves may prove to be rather opaque.21 Critics contend that
this outcome is both unsound and reveals political capture.22
16 Buiter, ‘Alice in Euroland’, 37 J Common Market Studies (1999) 181–209.
17 Lastra and Miller, ‘Central Bank Independence in Ordinary and Extraordinary Times’, in J. Kleineman
(ed.), Central Bank Independence: The Economic Foundations, the Constitutional Implications and Democratic
Accountability (1999).
18 On informal means of oversight, see Grant and Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics’, 99 American Political Science Rev (2005) 1.
19 See generally A. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence
(1992).
20 In many countries, as in the US, central banks are involved not only in monetary policy but also in bank-
ing regulation, and Basel involves both central bankers and bank regulators that are not central bank-
ers; thus, a description of Basel as involving a club of central bankers is incomplete.
21 Self-regulation has important advantages in flexibility and responsiveness: see I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite,
Responsive Regulation (1992), but may heighten concerns about accountability.
22 D. Wood, Governing Global Banking (2005), at 150.
20 EJIL 17 (2006), 15–46 
B Global Regulation
In addition to concerns of regulatory capture, the Basel process could be character-
ized as a kind of regulatory ‘imperialism’ in which the most powerful economic
nations meet to develop rules that will affect a broad range of countries excluded from
the process of developing the rules. While the Basel standards were intended only to
apply to internationally active banks in the G-10, the 1988 Accord was quickly
applied to all banks in the G-10, and over 100 other countries ‘voluntarily’ adopted
the accord. In a sense, many of these countries had little choice. Participation in the
markets that matter (the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and the European
Union) require home countries to meet Basel standards. Moreover, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank increasingly look to national implementation
of the Basel standards and Basel-level supervision as an indication of sound national pol-
icy. In addition, members of the WTO used the lever of IMF and World Bank conditional-
ity to foster financial services reforms, including coming up to Basel standards for capital
and supervision, in countries seeking assistance. The Basel process could be viewed as an
attempt by the G-10 to ensure continued hegemony over the developing world.
Moreover, even in the developed world, the move to global regulation has its critics
because, in their view, harmonization blocks regulatory competition. The Basel pro-
cess has been characterized by public choice scholars as an effort by national regula-
tors to maintain ‘their autonomy in the face of international competition’.23 The
efforts of national regulators to use global negotiations to increase their own power at
the expense of domestic private actors undermines the potential for regulatory com-
petition to lead to more efficient regulation.24 Competition among regulators, in this
view, serves as a powerful counterpoint to bureaucratic inertia and aggrandizement.
Harmonization creates lock-in that slows regulatory change and inhibits flexibility.
Competition, by contrast, would require regulators to innovate to retain jurisdiction
over banking organizations. If regulation becomes too burdensome, firms can shift
their activities, or organizational structures, to lower-burden jurisdictions. The
greater the level of coordination among supervisory authorities, the lower is the level
of utility of firms using regulatory arbitrage to evade regulatory burdens. The lower
threat from exit reduces incentives on regulators to develop efficient regulation.
Critics also contend that ‘home country enactment is simply a formality’.25 Thus,
opponents of global regulation, in this view, cannot effectively challenge trans-
national regulation at the domestic level. International rule-making becomes a way
of circumventing legislative oversight because Congress will not undo complex interna-
tional agreements, and a way of bypassing real administrative rule-making because
23 Macey, ‘The “Demand” for International Regulatory Cooperation: a Public-Choice Perspective’, in
B. Herdegen and P. Lindseth (eds), Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation (2000), at 147, 159.
24 Macey, ‘Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition’, 52 Emory L Rev (2003)
1353.
25 Tarbert, ‘Rethinking Capital Adequacy: The Basle Accord and the New Framework’, 56 Business L
(2001) 767, at 782.
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the domestic notice and comment rule-making will simply rubber stamp the decisions
made by the regulators during their international negotiations.
3 Basel Reconsidered
A The Substantive Case for the Existence of the Basel Process26
In our view, there is a strong case for international bank regulation. Prudential
supervision and capital standards are generally introduced to mitigate the prob-
lem of systemic risk from bank failures and the problem of moral hazard from
deposit insurance, as well as to protect taxpayers from demands for expensive bail-
outs in the event of widespread failures. The essential dilemmas of banking regula-
tion can be exacerbated in the international context, both because national
regulators face externalities that may hinder cooperation and information-sharing
and lead to races to the bottom on capital standards or supervision, and because
transnational banks can create special problems for systemic risk and regulation.
Supervision of transnational banks requires coordination between home and host
country supervisors.
The Basel process was designed to achieve harmonization or convergence in bank
capital standards and coordination of bank supervision among the major industrial-
ized countries whose banks dominate global banking.27 International banking activi-
ties and regulation generate transnational externalities that can result in credit
crunches (sharply restricted supply of credit) or contagion in bank failures from one
nation to another if capital standards are set too high or too low. These externalities
can be mitigated in part through transnational cooperation among supervisors.
Moreover, as in the debate over international bankruptcy,28 coordination on bank
capital standards and supervision can reduce distortions in investment decisions and
corporate structure.
Similarly, the Basel Committee helps to coordinate supervision to avoid strategic
games by multinational firms and races to the bottom on forbearance. Large trans-
national failures, such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, have dem-
onstrated the need for international coordination on supervision to prevent
transnational firms from evading capital requirements and supervision through
sham structures and transactions. Moreover, without coordination on supervision,
harmonized capital standards would not prevent destabilizing actions by regulators
in one country, for example, refusing to shut down troubled banks, which could
affect the safety and soundness of institutions headquartered or operating in other
26 The article makes a substantive case for having the Basel process, but does not provide a substantive
defence of the Basel II Accord, which is rightly the subject of intense debate.
27 We use harmonization and convergence interchangeably. By either word, we mean the process by
which national laws become more alike. In our usage, neither term requires that national laws are the
same, merely that they are becoming more alike.
28 Bebchuck and Guzman, ‘An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies’, 52 J L & Econ (1999)
775 (arguing that universality is more efficient than territoriality in bankruptcy).
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countries.29 Coordination of supervision limits the discretion of national regulators to
forebear, providing that there is sufficient transparency and monitoring by other reg-
ulators to prevent defection. Thus, for example, the Federal Reserve Board requires
compliance with Basel levels of supervision in the home country for that country’s
firms to operate in the United States.30 Regulators coordinating in Basel can pressure
their peers in other countries to provide more information, or risk exclusion from host
markets.
The Basel Committee has also developed principles designed to serve as common
rules of the game for bank supervisors. The Basel Concordat of 1975 set forth basic
expectations among supervisors regarding how they would work together in regulat-
ing transnational institutions. In 1992, the Committee issued a set of principles on
coordination between home and host regulators supervising internationally active
banks. In 1997, the Committee promulgated ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision’,31 which were developed with cooperation from central bankers from
emerging market economies and were widely adopted. The Basel Committee,
together with international bodies in the insurance and securities fields, has
developed suggestions for ways in which complex organizations can be regulated by
regulators operating under different regulatory regimes.32
Moreover, the Basel Committee generates global public goods of information and
expertise. Central bankers regularly meet at Basel to exchange information and views
on a wide range of topics. Because the Committee is small and homogenous, with
repeated interactions among the same players over long periods of time, its members
can talk with each other in an atmosphere of trust, and develop an understanding of
each other that serves them well during times of international financial crises.33 The
Bank for International Settlements, as host for the Basel Committee, also collects and
disseminates information on international financial transactions and the operation of
central banks. By building a consensus on the standards for reporting such informa-
tion and by disseminating it, the Bank contributes to transparency.34
Thus, the Basel Committee plays an important role in harmonizing capital stan-
dards, in improving and coordinating prudential supervision, and in providing global
public goods of information and good offices. The case for bank capital and supervi-
sory harmonization, however, must take account of the differences among nations,
29 See H.S. Scott and S. Iwahara, In Search of a Level Playing Field: The Implementation of the Basle Capital
Accord in Japan and the United States (1994) (finding that the 1988 Accord did not level the playing field
because of differences in governmental safety nets, forbearance policies, and other factors).
30 Federal Reserve Board, International Banking Organisations, Reg. K, 12 CFR (2004), §211.24(c).
31 Bank for International Settlements, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1977), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc102.pdf.
32 Bank for International Settlements, Joint Forum, Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, Feb. 1999, available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs47.htm.
33 See Fratianni and Pattison, ‘Review Essay: The Bank for International Settlements: An Assessment of its
Role in International Monetary and Financial Policy Coordination’, 12 Open Economic Rev (2001) 197,
at 213.
34 Ibid., at 214.
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even among advanced economies, in the structure of financial systems and the policy
trade-offs involved in regulation. It is to that issue that the next section turns.
B National Values and Policy Trade-offs
While harmonization of bank capital and supervisory standards serves important
goals of financial stability, global harmonization in bank regulation does involve
value judgments and policy trade-offs. It would be a mistake to view the Basel Com-
mittee as engaged only in value-neutral, expert, technocratic decision-making. Capi-
tal standards and prudential supervision inherently involve policy tradeoffs and
social norms.
Given that the work of the Basel Committee involves important judgments on con-
testable issues of policy, what procedures should be adopted to ensure that these
trade-offs are made in a manner which ensures an appropriate degree of accountabil-
ity and legitimacy? Given that the Basel process is less formal and results only in
non-binding standards to be implemented at the national level, the administrative
protections that are needed to achieve these objectives may be lower than in the
domestic regulatory context. But informality may also diminish transparency,
heighten concerns of capture, and limit the range of values considered. Informal insti-
tutions therefore might require more administrative oversight, not less. As with the
debate in domestic administrative law,35 there are trade-offs involved in imposing
formal notice and comment and similar requirements on international rule-making.
If the requirements are set too high, international negotiators may seek out more
informality to escape these requirements, resulting in even less public participation,
transparency and review.
The informality of the Basel Committee’s work, and the fact that the result of
Basel is a norm that gets further review at the national level, ought to be taken into
account in deciding what administrative rules to apply, and where to apply them.
In assessing global administrative law requirements, one ought to treat administra-
tive mechanisms at the transnational and national levels as part of an integrated
whole. Whenever possible, international mechanisms ought to be designed to
enhance, rather than supplant, the meaningfulness of domestic administrative law.
Moreover, one ought to be sensitive to developing administrative rules that will
work for the wide range of administrative processes that are occurring at the inter-
national level. To begin to address these issues, in the next section we explore how
the Basel Committee has fostered its own accountability and legitimacy through
self-imposed administrative requirements. In later sections we examine how these
efforts interact with national administrative law, and explore how international
and national administrative mechanisms contribute to developing a transnational
administrative law.
35 See, e.g., Strauss, ‘Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuming Proper Respect for an
Essential Element’, 53 Admin L Rev (2001) 803, at 808.
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C Promoting Accountability and Legitimacy through 
International Process
The Basel Committee has become more accountable over time. The process resulting
in the Capital Accords of 1988 were characterized by closed meetings with little or no
transparency. Negotiations were conducted without public input, and the final rule
was announced, in the words of one commentator, as a ‘fait accompli’.36 Domestic
implementation in the United States and the European Union occurred without much
additional process. But by the time of negotiations over the second accord, Basel had
begun to open up, in part as a response to financial institution pressure for greater
transparency and in part because substantive concerns with the first accord had
helped to galvanize a debate over new global rules. The Committee engaged in a series
of procedural steps that it had failed to take during the first accord. This section anal-
yses the steps that the Committee has taken to increase its accountability and legiti-
macy, for example, through increased transparency and public participation.37
1 Notice and Comment Rule-making by the Basel Committee
Over time, banks, commentators, and regulators became increasingly dissatisfied
with the 1988 Accord as overly rigid, not well-aligned with risk, subject to regulatory
arbitrage, politicized, and subject to distortion. After a series of small amendments
from 1998 to the mid-1990s, by 1996, the Committee undertook a much more com-
prehensive revision. On 3 June 1999, it issued a consultative paper, ‘A New Capital
Adequacy Framework’, that laid out the ‘three pillars’ of a new accord: a more flexi-
ble, market-oriented capital standard; enhanced supervisory capacity; and enhanced
disclosure so that market participants and regulators could assess bank risk. With
respect to the capital standard, the Committee indicated that it would be exploring
three approaches: improvements to the existing 1988 Accord, an approach based on
internal risk measurement, and an approach based on models of portfolio credit risk.
The Committee requested comments on the framework.
Banks, industry associations and other interested parties deluged the Committee
with more than 200 comment letters on the consultative paper, expressing concerns
about problems with using external credit rating agencies that are common in the
US but not in Europe; concerns about the lack of differentiation among kinds of risks;
and opposition to inclusion of operational risk in the capital standard.38 During
1999–2000, the Committee issued background papers to inform the public about its
thinking on key issues, and held workshops with banks and other firms. Committee
task forces also issued background papers on transparency to promote market disci-
pline and on internal-risk mechanisms based on surveys of internationally active
36 See Zaring, supra note 10.
37 On the connection between public participation and legitimacy, see Howse, ‘Transatlantic Cooperation
and the Problem of Democracy’, in G.A. Bermann, M. Herdegen, and P.L. Lindseth (eds), Transatlantic
Regulatory Cooperation (2000), at 469, 480.
38  See Wood, supra note 22, at 134–136.
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banks. The Committee received public comments on these, largely from academia
and the banking industry.
The Committee released a second consultative package as a proposal for a ‘New
Basel Capital Accord’ in January 2001. The proposal and supporting documents
stood at a mind-numbing 541 pages. The Committee requested comments and posted
replies on its webpage. The Committee received 259 comments, mostly from large
industry players, but also from governments, academics, other international organi-
zations, community banks, credit unions, and even one community group.39 Banks
generally argued that the charge for operational risk was wrong-headed. Banks in
Europe worried that increased capital charges for small business lending would disad-
vantage them relative to their American counterparts because the former relied more
heavily on such lending. Less-developed countries worried that the Basel standards
would be too complex for their supervisory agencies and banks to administer. In their
view, the new approach would hasten the trend towards mergers with banks in the
developed world.40 Meanwhile, German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder opposed the
draft accord on the grounds that it would diminish German bank lending to small
businesses, and the Japanese and Italian governments joined suit.41
Controversy over the consultative paper and the sheer complexity of the proposal
and comments on it led the Committee to postpone drafting the final version of the
new accord. In June 2001, the Committee issued a press release stating that it was
still reviewing the comments and that it intended to ‘continue promoting an open
dialogue . . . ’. The Committee noted that it was working on revisions to the proposal
with respect to operational risk, small business lending and other matters. In September,
the Committee issued another ‘update’ on its work, as ‘part of its continuing dialogue
with the banking industry and other relevant parties . . .’. At the end of that year, the
Committee announced that it would be conducting further review. The Committee
noted that it ‘has been significantly encouraged by the depth and extent of interaction
with market participants. . . . The dialogue has been extremely constructive.’
In 2002, the Committee issued a press release stating that it had reached agree-
ment on a number of points that had been in dispute. In a nod to the Germans, the
Committee permitted a lower capital charge for lending to small businesses. The Com-
mittee yielded somewhat on capital charges for operational risk by removing the pro-
posed floor on operational risk charges and introducing much more supervisory
discretion into the assessment of operational risk. Moreover, the Committee indicated
that it expected to let actual capital levels for individual banks fall below existing lev-
els required to meet the minimum capital requirements, with gradual elimination of
capital floors after the first two years of implementation.
39 Authors’ calculations based on comments downloaded from the Basel Committee’s website, available at
www.bis.org/bcbs/cacomments.htm.
40 Authors’ analysis of comments on the Basel Committee’s website, ibid. See also Wood, supra note 22, at
138–139.
41 Wood, supra note 22, at 141.
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The Committee received 187 comments on the third consultative package, which
was publicly released in 2003.42 The comments were again dominated by banks and
industry groups, but included comments by a range of other entities. Later that year,
the Committee noted that it had ‘identified opportunities to improve the framework’
in response to the comments relating to credit losses, asset securitization, credit cards
and risk mitigation; the Committee again invited comment on its specific proposal
with respect to credit losses.43 Some 52 institutions and others commented on this
proposal, and in January 2004 the Committee published proposed revisions to the
consultative paper based on its review of the comments, as well as technical papers on
other issues. In May, the Committee announced that it reached agreement on out-
standing issues and published the contours of the consensus that had been reached.
In June 2004, the Committee finally released the new accord, entitled ‘Interna-
tional Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’. The Committee
‘indicated that the Basel Committee’s work benefited from the transparency and scale
of the public consultations that took place both within the G-10 countries and around
the world, helping to make the new framework a global product’ and noted that the
Committee ‘would continue to work in the spirit of openness and consultation in the
future’.44 While national reviews of Basel II, discussed below, entered a heightened
phase, the Committee further refined its proposals. Working with securities regula-
tors in the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the
Committee issued a proposal for comment in April 2005 relating to trading losses.
The notice and comment rule-making included significant participation and
improvements in transparency that permitted a wider range of actors to comment on
the rule-making. Moreover, by posting comments on its website, the Basel Committee
made it easier for the public to assess whether the Committee was being responsive to
the concerns expressed by commentators. Most participants, however, were large fin-
ancial institutions. The role of the broader public was relatively muted, which
reflected in part the technical nature of the Basel Committee’s work and the fact that
for most public-interested organizations, the connection between banking standards
and broader social concerns was not pronounced. Moreover, the costs of acquiring
information and expertise in order effectively to engage in the notice and comment
process at the international level are undoubtedly higher than participation in
domestic rule-making, even with internet-based rule-making lowering the physical
costs of participation.
Overall, the Basel Committee’s work on the new accord appears to have been
responsive to suggestions made during the notice and comment process. There were
real changes in the proposed standards relating to a wide variety of areas, including
42 Authors’ calculations, available at www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3comments.htm www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3comments.
htm.
43 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Press Release, ‘Basel II: Significant Progress on Major Issues’,
11 Oct. 2003, available at www.bis.org/press/p031011.htm.
44 BIS, Press Release, ‘G10 Central bank governors and heads of supervision endorse the publication of the
revised capital framework’, 26 June 2004, available at www.bis.org/press/p040626.htm.
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how to measure operational risk, the role of rating agencies, the appropriate capital
standard for small business lending, the complexity of supervisory formula, and secu-
ritizations. It is difficult to know whether the Committee’s changes were driven by
internal discussion among national regulators, or by external input generated by the
notice and comment process. Likely, the changes were a result of a combination of
factors.
The Basel Committee also engaged in explicit cost–benefit and economic analyses
supporting reasoned (albeit highly contestable) judgments, as part of the notice and
comment rule-making. The Committee launched four rounds of quantitative impact
studies designed to measure the impact of the proposed accord on actual levels of cap-
ital held by banks around the world. The studies were conducted using data supplied
by the banks themselves, and included exercises designed to measure alternative
approaches that the Committee was considering during successive rounds of consult-
ative papers. More than 350 banks from over 40 countries participated in these stud-
ies. Results from the studies, together with analyses, were made available to the
public. The last quantitative impact study found that the new accord would result in
much lower overall levels of capital in the United States than previously believed, and
has delayed implementation of the new accord. The Basel Committee issued a notice
in March 2005 that it would be launching a fifth quantitative impact study to get a
better handle on the effects of the accord and to review the data in spring 2006.
2 The Basel Committee’s Initiatives to Promote National Accountability 
beyond the G-10
In addition to measures designed to improve accountability and legitimacy generally,
the Basel Committee made some effort to improve the Committee’s responsiveness to
non-G-10 countries. The Committee recognized that the 1988 capital standards had
been widely adopted, including by countries that had no role in their development.
The Committee also understood that the new capital standards were likely to influ-
ence banking policy beyond the G-10, given the strong role of market pressure, and
IMF and World Bank policy, on decision-making by developing countries. The Com-
mittee thus instituted a process of national and regional central banker consultations
among non-G-10 nations. Over time, the Basel Committee began to invite central
bankers and supervisors from non-G-10 countries to provide input into the Basel pro-
cess. Central bankers formed regional groups to share information about supervision
and to coordinate in providing input into the formation of global capital standards.
Developing countries participated in the creation of the 25 ‘Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision’ in 1997, which were aimed to respond to the need to
strengthen domestic regulation in the developing world in the face of the series of fin-
ancial crises then unfolding. Unlike the capital accords, which were aimed initially at
the internationally active banks within the G-10, the explicit aim of the Core Princi-
ples was ‘to be applied by all countries in the supervision of the banks in their jurisdic-
tions’.45 In addition to the Basel Committee membership itself, 16 other supervisory
45 BIS, supra note 31.
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agencies, including some from the developing world, participated in the drafting of
the principles, and the regional supervisory groups endorsed the principles.46
Developing countries also provided input into the new accord. Basel Committee
members participated in meetings of the regional supervisory groups as early as
1999. The Committee formed a Core Principles Liaison Group on supervisory issues
and a sub-group focused on capital adequacy composed of the Secretary General of
the Basel Committee, representatives from the G-10, the World Bank, the IMF, and
non-G-10 developing countries to focus on non-G-10 views and problems in the
development of the new accord. Banks from a number of non-G-10 countries partici-
pated in the quantitative impact studies commissioned by the Committee. Member-
ship in the Bank for International Settlements (but not the Basel Committee itself)
also expanded over the last decade to include some emerging market countries
important to global financial stability. In the Committee’s view, expressed in the third
consultative paper: 
[a] critical component of the Committee’s efforts to revise the Basel Accord has been its extens-
ive dialogue with industry participants and with supervisors from outside member countries.
As a result of these consultations, the Committee believes the new framework with its various
options will be suitable not only within the G10 but also for banks and for countries around
the world to apply to their banking systems.47
The Liaison Groups were instrumental in the development of the ‘Simplified Stand-
ardized Approach’ to capital contained as an option in the Basel II framework.
4 Promoting Accountability and Legitimacy through 
Transnational Processes for Incorporating Basel Norms: 
The Case of the United States
Basel is a non-binding standard. It needs to be implemented through national pro-
cesses. National processes can, in some cases, provide an important venue for
enhanced transparency and public participation by bringing the Basel process home,
where the public is more likely to know how to engage, more likely to understand the
implications of the Basel process for domestic issues, and more likely to find it cost-
effective to intervene, either individually, or through interest groups. Moreover,
national processes anchor Basel decision-making in national mechanisms of adminis-
trative accountability. These national mechanisms for administrative review provide
46 See ibid., at 3. The regional groups are: the Arab Committee on Banking Supervision, the Caribbean
Banking Supervisors Group, the Association of Banking Supervisory Authorities of Latin America and
the Caribbean, the Eastern and Southern Africa Banking Supervisors’ Group, the EMEAP Study Group
on Banking Supervision, the Group of Banking Supervisors from Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries, the Gulf Cooperation Council Banking Supervisors’ Committee, the Offshore Group of Banking
Supervisors, the Regional Supervisory Group of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, the SEANZA Forum of
Banking Supervisors, the Committee of Banking Supervisors in West and Central Africa: ibid., at 3, n.3.
47 ‘Basel II: The New Basel Capital Accord—Third Consultative Paper’, Apr. 2003, at 2, available at
www.bis.org/bcbs/bcbscp3.htm.
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further input into the Basel process and thus help to shape the Basel standard in a
way that is responsive to public concerns within the constituent nations of the Com-
mittee, and more broadly where the Basel standard is to be adopted by non-Committee
countries. The Basel Committee ‘acknowledges the importance of national rule-
making processes underway in several jurisdictions and that it will need to consider
the outcome of these national processes’ before finalizing the new accord.48 More-
over, the Committee’s efforts to promote accountability and legitimacy through
notice and comment rulemaking and public participation, have, in turn, helped to
enhance these national administrative measures. As we shall show, openness at the
international level can increase opportunities for public participation at the national
level, improve the nature of the deliberations, and can make it more likely that
domestic oversight of international rulemaking is real, not rubber-stamping. The
interactions among national and international administrative processes are what
make global administrative law ‘transnational.’
A Notice and Comment Rule-making by US Agencies
During the Basel process, the US banking agencies issued two advance notices of pro-
posed rule-making regarding the negotiations. In 2000, the agencies issued an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) regarding whether the agencies
should issue a ‘Simplified Capital Framework for Non-Complex Institutions’.49 In
2003, the agencies issued an ANPR on the Committee’s draft accord of that year.50
Significantly, the agencies sought comment not only on how the accord should be
implemented in the United States, but also on the positions that the regulators should
take with respect to negotiations on the accord.51 While comments on the first rule
are not available online, the agencies increased the transparency of the process by the
second ANPR and published the comments. The agencies received 125 comments,
most of which were from industry; however, community group representation was
significantly larger in this pool of comments than among those received at the inter-
national level by the Basel Committee. Over 25 community organizations com-
mented on the ANPR. Most of these organizations focused on the implications of the
capital rules for equity investments in community development financial institutions,
small business investment companies and related investments serving the public
welfare.52
In addition to the ANPRs, the agencies then published additional requests for comment
on agency supervisory guidance, regarding corporate credit risk and operational
48 Basel Committee, supra note 43.
49 65 Fed Reg 66193 (3 Nov. 2000).
50 ‘Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Implementation of New Basel Capital Accord’, 68 Fed Reg 45,900
(4 Aug. 2003).
51 Ibid. at 45,901.
52 See, e.g., comment letters from the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, the Community Development
Bankers’ Association, the CDFI Coalition, and the Community Partners Financial Group, all dated
3 Nov. 2003, and available at www.federalreserve.gov.
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risk,53 and the following year regarding internal risk models as a whole.54 The pub-
lication of a request for comment on agency guidance, in advance of a notice of pro-
posed rule-making, served to formalize a guidance procedure that is usually subject to
much less transparency and accountability than a formal rule-making. The agencies
also published requests for information on the quantitative impact of the new accord
as proposed to be implemented in the United States,55 and an interagency statement
on how the agencies viewed the process of qualification for the advanced risk meas-
urement methodologies.56 Thus, in this instance, the presence of transnational regu-
lation enhanced, rather than diminished, the opportunity for public participation in
domestic rule-making. Given the technical nature of the guidance and its limited
applicability beyond the largest banks, however, only 18 comments were received,
almost all of which were from these large firms.
In 2004, the agencies issued a press release providing notice of the Basel Commit-
tee’s issuance of the new accord.57 The agencies also issued a series of white papers
analysing the potential effects of the new accord on home mortgage and small busi-
ness lending, competition in various banking sectors, bank mergers, and other mat-
ters, including papers suggesting that the new accord could harm non-adopters with
respect to the home mortgage market.58 The FDIC published a white paper critical of
the new standards that suggested that they would result in required levels of capital
much lower than currently permissible for purposes of the US Prompt Corrective
Action statute, and that ‘U.S. regulators will have to choose between ignoring the
output of Basel II’s formulas or significantly weakening the current PCA frame-
work’.59 Recently, the United States decided to delay implementing the new accord
because the fourth quantitative impact study revealed evidence regarding differen-
tial and much larger than expected effects of the new accord on capital standards
among US banks.60 Important policy-makers continue to signal that the domestic
implementation of Basel II will take longer and will be more complicated than
initially anticipated.61
53 68 Fed Reg 45,949 (4 Aug. 2003).
54 ‘Internal Ratings-based Systems for Retail Credit Risk for Regulatory Capital’, 69 Fed Reg 62,748
(27 Oct. 2004).
55 See http://www.ffiec.gov/qis4; http://www.ffiec.gov/ldce.
56 ‘Interagency Statement—US Implementation of Basel II Framework Qualification Process—IRB and
AMA’, 27 Jan. 2005, available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/pres/2005/pr0305a.html.
57 Joint Press Release, 26 June 2004, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/
2004/20040626/.
58 See Basel II Capital Accord, White Papers and Other Background Documents, available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/basel2/whitepapers.htm.
59 French, ‘Estimating the Capital Impact of Basel II in the United States’, in FDIC, FYI, An Update on Emerg-
ing Issues in Banking, 8 Dec. 2003 (revised 5 Aug. 2004); see also Kupiec, ‘Capital Adequacy and Basel
II’, FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2004-02, available at http://www.fdic.gov.
60 Joint Release, ‘Banking Agencies to Perform Additional Analysis Before Issuing Notice of Proposed Rule-
making related to Basel II’, 29 April 2005, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.
aspx?JNR=1&Doc=KLDCDKRC.xml.
61 See Paletta, ‘Dugan Adds Voice to Basel Go-Slow Choir’, American Banker, 27 Sept. 2005, at 1, 4.
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Contrary to Zaring,62 the evidence suggests that this domestic rule-making process
is real and not ‘too late’. Comments on domestic rule-making can and did influence
the global standard and its national implementation. National administrative mecha-
nisms can contribute to global administrative law. Moreover, the administrative
measures undertaken by the Basel Committee itself, with respect to transparency,
notice and comment rule-making, and public participation, appear to have enhanced
domestic US administrative oversight. Industry representatives, the public, and inter-
ested parties were able to participate more effectively in domestic rule-making
because they had had access to information from the ongoing Basel Committee work
and were exposed to competing views taken during the international negotiations.
The transparency of international rule-making made it easier for competing interests
to assess whether regulatory positions taken reflected capture by important industry
players.63
B Differential Application by the US Rebuts Hegemony
Because the Basel Committee develops standards that are intended to harmonize
national rules, rather than standards that bind nations directly, each participant in
the Basel Committee can choose how to implement the new accord domestically.
While national variation reduces the extent to which harmonization yields the
same standard, national variation that is consistent with the essential principles of
a global standard can serve to enhance the legitimacy of the global standard and
increase the likelihood that the global regulatory process has a wider reach among
nations.
In the United States, the agencies have chosen to develop a ‘bifurcated regulatory
capital framework’ under which most banks could continue to apply a modified ver-
sion of the 1988 Accords, while the largest internationally active banks (holding
almost all of the US share of foreign assets and about two-thirds of all US domestic
assets) would apply the advanced internal-ratings based approach developed under
the new accord.64 Under this method, these large institutions rely on their own
assessments of risk as the primary inputs into supervisory formulas for capital
requirements. The largest of these large banks would be required to apply the new
approach, while other large institutions could opt-in to using this methodology.
The vast majority of banks in the United States would continue to apply Basel I. In
the United States, this means in effect that the largest 10 banking organizations
62 Zaring, supra note 10.
63 The contrary prediction, that international negotiations undermine domestic legitimacy, derives from
Robert Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 42 Int’l Organization
(1988) 427. Precisely because we are concerned about such possibilities, we argue for international and
domestic administrative processes that are designed to enmesh international rule-making in national
modes of legitimation and accountability.
64 68 Fed Reg, at 45,902. See also Testimony of Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Basel II, before the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, US Senate, 18 June 2003 (describing the rationale
for the bifurcated approach).
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would be required to adopt the approach, and the next 10 are likely to opt-in. The Basel
Committee had also developed a ‘foundation’ internal-ratings based approach that
required firms to use more formulaic risk inputs from supervisors, but the US agencies
decided not to apply that rule to any US bank on the theory that it was too complicated
for smaller banking organizations, and too prescriptive for more sophisticated ones.65
The US decision has, thus far, not undone the essential contours of agreement over
implementation of Basel II in other countries. As we discuss below, many other coun-
tries have decided to move gradually or in stages to Basel II, while others are proceed-
ing to implement Basel II for all their banks. If such national variation continues,
while the consensus of moving toward harmonization under Basel II persists, then
the Basel process can be seen as an important example of enhancing the legitimacy of
international regulation through a fluid process of convergence, rather than a dog-
matic insistence that harmonization requires that all nations’ laws be the same.
C Differential Voices among Regulatory Agencies in the United States
Other aspects of domestic implementation can also reinforce the accountability of
regulators in Basel. In the United States, banking supervision is divided at the federal
level among the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Board has been more supportive of
the Basel Committee’s substantive decisions than has the other big player, the OCC.
In particular, the Comptroller has criticized the overwhelming complexity of the Basel
standard, as well as its continued reliance on excessive supervisory inputs.66 The
FDIC has also been critical of the Basel accords from time to time.67 The Board, by con-
trast, has tended to support the approach taken in Basel much more wholeheartedly.
The fact that the US agencies have disagreed so strongly has itself helped to
improve the transparency of the process, and may have contributed to improvements
in the new standard. Officials from these agencies have repeatedly disagreed in public
speeches and congressional testimony. The public disagreement provides a useful
window on key disputes in the Basel negotiations, and provides the public with an
65 On the difficulty that many banks would have in implementing the complex Basel rules, see Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Press Release, ‘Comptroller Hawke Restates U.S. Commitment to Basel Cap-
ital Process But Warns that Many Complex and Difficult Issues Must Still be Resolved’, 13 Dec. 2003,
available at www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=DVWLJZB1.xml. As discussed below, by
contrast, the EU proposed to apply Basel II to all its banks through its third Capital Adequacy Directive.
See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of The Council Re-casting
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March
1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, vols I and II, COM (2004) 486,
final (14 July 2004).
66 See, e.g., ‘Comptroller Hawke Restates U.S. Commitment to Basel Capital Process But Warns that Many
Complex and Difficult Issues Must Still be Resolved’, Speech to the American Academy, Berlin, 15 Dec.
2003, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=DVWLJZB1.xml; John D.
Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, ‘Remarks before the Institute of International Bankers’,
Washington, DC, 3 Mar. 2003.
67 See Paletta, ‘Whither Basel II? Regulators Spar; Lawmakers Fume’, American Banker, 12 May 2005, at 3.
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additional check on the activity of the negotiators. Moreover, the substantive dis-
agreement even with the US national regulatory regime likely contributed to more
reasoned decision-making, or at least more reasoned articulation of whatever
decision-making was occurring. The failure of the United States to speak with ‘one
voice’68 regarding Basel contributed to having a more open transnational regulatory
process. Moreover, the more transparent regulatory process of the Basel Committee
helped to reveal these inter-institutional differences, which might have been more
muted under the old ‘club’ model of international negotiations. The division among
regulators may enhance transparency, public engagement and dialogue, as well as
accountability and rationality at the international level as compared with transna-
tional regulation developed by monolithic regulators within each country. Most
nations, however, have a single, consolidated regulator for their banks, and many are
moving towards a single regulator for banking, securities and insurance. While con-
solidated regulation has many benefits, one important downside is that a single regu-
lator may result in less transparency in international negotiations.
D US Congressional Oversight
Participation of US regulators in the Basel Committee could be problematic from the
perspective of democratic legitimacy for a number of reasons. Normally, executive
branch participation in international negotiations is within the power of the Presi-
dent to conduct foreign affairs. Executive branch officials in international negotia-
tions are representing the United States. In the context of discussions in the Basel
Committee, this is somewhat problematic, because the Federal Reserve Board, as an
independent agency and in effect the lead agency in negotiations, is not representing
the President. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which also participates in the
Basel negotiations, is even further removed from mechanisms of presidential control
because its leadership is chosen by the system itself, and it does not represent the
United States as a nation. Nor does the FDIC. The OCC, while within the Treasury
Department and thus in effect representing the interests of the executive branch, is
also somewhat insulated by statute from executive branch control even on broad reg-
ulatory matters. There is no lead agency designed by Congress or the President.
The lack of presidential oversight of US participants at Basel heightens the need for
congressional oversight, with respect to ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the pro-
cess, holding US regulators accountable for their negotiating positions, and enhancing
opportunities for public participation and transparency in the development of transna-
tional regulation. Congressional oversight occurs both ex ante and ex post.
Ex ante, congressional authorization is important to legitimacy. With respect to the
Basel process, Congress has in fact authorized the federal banking agencies to ‘consult
with the banking supervisory authorities of other countries to reach understandings
aimed at achieving the adoption of effective and consistent supervisory policies and
68 Cf. Cleveland, ‘Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations’, 46 Villanova L Rev (2001)
975, at 1013 (arguing that the Supreme Court wrongly created doctrine).
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practices with respect to international banking’.69 Congress also directed that the
‘Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary
of the Treasury shall encourage governments, central banks, and regulatory
authorities of other major banking countries to work toward maintaining and,
where appropriate, strengthening the capital bases of banking institutions involved
in international lending’.70 Congress directed that US membership of the Basel club
be enlarged beyond the Board and the OCC to include ‘equal representation’ for the
FDIC.71 The banking agencies have the authority to translate international under-
standings into minimum capital requirements.72 The Senate has also confirmed the
nominations of three of the four principal negotiators, which provides some addi-
tional, albeit small, measure of congressional oversight.
Ex post, congressional hearings provide additional transparency to the Basel process
as well as a means to hold regulators accountable for the development of transnational
regulation. The Congressional role ex post should not be overstated, however.73 Con-
gressional oversight through hearings is a rather weak form of control.74 That is even
more so when the main lever of congressional control, agency appropriations, are
inapplicable, because the Federal Reserve is funded by interest on its securities hold-
ings and the OCC is funded by bank fees. Congressional oversight also tends to be rela-
tively weaker with respect to international matters than to solely domestic concerns.
Still, Congressional oversight does play an important role in enhancing compliance
with the norms of accountability and legitimacy underlying global administrative law.
Congressional committee chairs were in contact with US regulators during the course
of the Basel negotiations to express their concerns about the draft accords.75 Both the
House and the Senate held hearings leading up to, and after agreement on, the new
accord. Members focused much of their concern on issues of competitive equality
between US banks and foreign banks and between large US banks adopting the new
internal-ratings based approach and regional and local banks continuing to use Basel I.
The Comptroller used the hearings to further the OCC’s negotiating position in the Basel
process,76 particularly with respect to the overall complexity of the proposal.77 The con-
gressional hearings highlighted the central problem of governance: US negotiators at
69 International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 USC § 3901(b) (2005).
70 Ibid.; 12 USC § 3907(b)(3)(C) (2005).
71 Ibid.; 12 USC § 3911 (2005).
72 Ibid., 12 USC 3907(a)(1) (2005).
73 But see Zaring, supra note 10. (arguing its importance).
74 McCubbins and Lupia, ‘Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed’, 10 J of
Law, Econ. & Org. (1994) 96.
75 See, e.g., Letter from Cong. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, and Cong. Barney Frank to Chairman Greenspan, 10
Oct. 2002 (expressing concern about operational risk measurements and suggesting the need for a hearing).
76 See, e.g., House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Hearing, 19 June 2003,
‘The New Basel Accord: In Search of a Unified U.S. Position’, 41 (response of Mr. Hawke arguing that
congressional involvement ‘will strengthen our position vis-à-vis the Basel Committee’).
77 House, Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary
Policy, Technology, and Economic Growth, Hearing, ‘The New Basel Accord: Sound Regulation or
Crushing Complexity?’, 27 Feb. 2003, at 18.
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Basel speak for themselves, not the United States, and there is no lead agency desig-
nated by Congress or the President.78 Hearings have continued to highlight substan-
tive and procedural concerns in the months following release of Basel II and notices of
US implementation plans.
E Summary of US-Basel Administrative Interactions
Domestic US administrative mechanisms have helped to enhance the accountability
and legitimacy of international rule-making at Basel. Similarly, congressional over-
sight has played a role in shaping regulator behaviour. These national measures,
embedded in the democratic politics of the United States, have served as important
means to fulfil the promise of global administrative law. At the same time, enhanced
administrative openness at Basel reinforced domestic administrative law by making
it easier for Congress to understand the trade-offs involved in the international nego-
tiations and to police their agents’ conformity with legislative goals. Transparency
at the international level also enhanced the capacity of interested parties to particip-
ate in domestic rule-making, and diminished the extent to which regulators could be
captured without detection in developing the international rule subject to domestic
deliberation.
US regulators at Basel are not ‘agencies on the loose’, but there is room for greater
accountability and legitimacy. For example, both democratic legitimacy and national
accountability could be enhanced through the congressional requirement of a United
States’ negotiating position for Basel. However, requirement of a unified position
might undermine transparency, because it is in part because of the dissention among
US regulators that the public gained increased awareness of the Basel process and
opportunities to comment meaningfully. Moving Basel more toward a treaty-making
model of international negotiation and congressional approval might increase national
accountability, but actually reduce public participation and transparency that have
been built into the domestic and transnational regulatory processes of Basel.
5 Promoting Accountability and Legitimacy through 
Transnational Processes: The Case of the European Union
Other countries have developed their own procedures for participating in the Basel
process. These myriad approaches can, in some cases, enhance national accountabil-
ity, increase transparency and public participation, and thus reinforce the means by
which the Basel process is moving towards the means and ends of global administra-
tive law. This section looks at the European Union’s approach to the Basel process.
Unlike the process for adoption of the Basel Accord in the United States and other
countries, adoption in the European Union requires intermediation between Basel
and national governments in the institutions of the European Community.
78 See ibid., at 31–32.
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As in the United States, in the European Union the Basel Accord does not operate
with direct effect; it must be made European Union law. The 1988 Accord had been
issued as a Capital Adequacy Directive without much public or national debate. By
contrast, during the process leading up to the new accord and since its publication,
the EU has sought to enmesh the Basel Committee’s work in the EU structures of
decision-making. The European Commission itself participates in the Basel Commit-
tee as an ‘observer’. The Commission implemented a ‘structured dialogue’ beginning
in 2002 to facilitate communication between the Commission and the public. The
Commission published a working document on the new Basel approach and solicited
comments in November 2002. The working document noted that the Basel consulta-
tive paper would need to be ‘appropriately differentiated where necessary to take
account of specificities of the EU context’.79 In particular, the Commission focused on
lending to small businesses and the desire to apply the Basel Accord to all credit institu-
tions in the EU as important European concerns. The Commission published 115 com-
ments received on the working document on the Commission’s website in April 2003.
The Commission released a third Capital Adequacy Directive in July 2003 as a
‘Third Consultation Paper’,80 based on the draft of the new accord, and provided
extensive discussion of earlier comments. The EU, under the third Capital Adequacy
Directive, proposed that Basel II apply to all banks, not just the largest internationally
active banks, as in the United States. The Commission posted comments on the third
consultative paper in the fall of 2003, and published an analysis of the 128 com-
ments it received in March 2004. The ‘Feedback on Responses Received’ discussed
the Commission’s position in detail regarding the comments. After publication of the
new accord in June 2004, the Commission proposed a new Directive in July.81 The
Directive largely follows the new accord, but with special provisions regarding small
business lending, special rules for applications from cross-border financial groups to
go through a ‘consolidating supervisor’ and other EU-specific approaches.82
Unlike the regulatory process in the US, under which the banking agencies will
publish regulations to implement Basel II, in the European Union, the Commission’s
proposed Directive is to be adopted as EU legislation by the European Parliament and
the European Council after deliberation and review. Whether involvement by the
79 European Commission, Internal Market DG, Working Document of the Commission Services on Capital
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Firms’, 14 July 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/
899&; language=en&guiLanguage=en; European Commission, Proposal for Directives of the European
Parliament and of the Council, Re-casting Directive 200/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 Mar. 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and
Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 Mar. 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit
institutions, 14 July 2004 available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/
com-2004-486/volume1_en.pdf (‘European Commission Proposal’).
82 European Commission Proposal, supra note 80.
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European Parliament is enough for national publics to view EU legislation as demo-
cratically legitimate is currently very much in doubt, but European parliamentary
review may contribute to such legitimacy even if it falls short, on its own, of confer-
ring legitimacy in the eyes of the European public.
The European Parliament had begun to review the Basel process as early as 2000,
and its oversight continued over the next several years.83 The Parliament focused on
the effects of the Basel proposals on small business and home mortgage lending,84
which in turn helped to inform the Commission’s work.85 Parliament also staked out
a claim for a stronger role in the development of international negotiations on bank-
ing matters going forward. The Parliament stated that it ‘[r]egrets that the Basel
Accord and other international agreements laying down a framework for legislation
at EU level came into existence without any form of democratic mandate or control by
the European Parliament; expresses the view that, in future, questions with such far-
reaching political implications should not be determined in advance by expert com-
mittees alone’.86 The Council provided its own input into the proposed directive,
resulting in changes that further adapt the Basel standards for the European Union.87
Most recently, the Committee of Economic and Monetary Affairs in the European Par-
liament submitted 887 amendments to the proposed directive, which will likely con-
tribute to the public debate, but further delay implementation.88 Still, the European
Parliament approved the directive this fall.
In addition to review by the European Commission, Parliament and Council, the
European Central Bank, as a ‘peer’ institution,89 and itself an ‘observer’ in the Basel
process, published its opinion on the proposed directive in 2005.90 The ECB was sup-
portive of the new directive and the underlying new accord, but urged that the regu-
latory details currently embodied in the directive were better left to Committee and
national regulation. At the same time the ECB called for strong limits on the discre-
tion of national regulators to provide for exemptions and waivers under the directive,
and argued for greater harmonization of supervision across jurisdictions.
Member States of the European Union, at both the level of supervisory authorities
participating in the Basel process directly, and at the level of heads of state, have also
helped to shape the conversation regarding the Basel standards. Nine members of the
European Union participate directly on the Basel Committee. As noted above, Gerhard
Schroeder took a strong stance against early versions of the new accord that he believed
83 See, e.g., European Parliament resolution on the evaluation of Directive 89/299/EEC on the own funds
of banks (2000/2207(INI)), 17 Nov. 2000; Draft report on capital adequacy of banks (Basel II), Commit-
tee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 11 June 2003; European Parliament resolution on the adequacy
of banks’ own funds (Basel II) (2001/2257(INI)), 2 Sept. 2003.
84 Ibid.
85 See Commission Services, Third Consultation Paper, review of Capital Requirements for Banks and
Investment Firms, Explanatory Document, 1 July 2003, at 8.
86 European Parliament Resolution, supra note 82, at para. 4.
87 See ECOFIN text, 7 Dec. 2004.
88 See http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004_2009/organes/econ/ECON_20050712_1500.htm.
89 See Zilioli, supra note 20.
90 European Central Bank, Opinion of the European Central Bank, 17 Feb. 2005.
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would disadvantage German banks in their lending to German small businesses.
Although some criticized Schroeder’s intervention as unwarranted political interference
with technical banking matters, the German government’s decision publicly to stake
out its position contributes to the legitimacy and transparency of the Basel process.
Once the process of enacting the directive at the level of the European Union is
complete, the supervisory authorities in the 25 Member States will need to develop
implementing regulations, which will again provide opportunities for public notice
and comment rule-making. There is room for significant discretion at the national
level under the proposed directive, and national governments will make important
choices regarding implementation. These choices ought to be, and in many respects
are, being opened up to public processes of participation.
For example, in the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has pub-
lished three consultative papers as well as a regulatory impact assessment for comment
during the Basel and Community Directive processes.91 The FSA received 35 comments
on its 2003 consultative paper, posted them on its website, and responded to the com-
ments in the 2005 consultation paper, in which it again solicited comments from the
public. In addition, the FSA’s regulations – together with Treasury regulations under the
European Communities Act – implementing the directive (once enacted by the EU) would
go through review by the ‘scrutiny’ committees of the House of Lords and House of Com-
mons as well as Parliament’s European Standing Committee. The FSA has set up working
groups that include industry representatives and will continue to publish minutes of the
meetings and working papers prepared for discussions with industry representatives.92
There will also be opportunities for public input during the EU’s process of trans-
national coordination of regulation through the European Banking Committee and
transnational coordination of supervision through the newly established Commit-
tee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). CEBS has promised to come up with
measures to promote transparency, accountability and public participation in its
work implementing Basel and related supervisory measures.93 Even before enact-
ment of the directive, CEBS issued a consultation paper on how CEBS envisioned
Basel’s second pillar, regarding supervisory review, playing out in the European Union.94
CEBS solicited public comment and posted the 14 responses on its website.95 In June
91 See Financial Services Authority, ‘UK Implementation of the New Basel and EU Capital Adequacy Stand-
ards’, FSA Discussion Paper 13, July 2002; FSA, Report and First Consultation on the Implementation of
the New Basel and EU Capital Adequacy Standards, Consultation Paper 189, July 2003, available at
http://www.fsa.gov/uk/pubs/cp/cp189.pdf; FSA, ‘Strengthening Capital Standards, including Feedback
on CP189’, Consultation Paper 05/3, Jan. 2005, available at http://www.fsa/gov.uk/pages/library/policy/
cp/2005/05_03.shtml.
92 See Hector Sants, ‘Basel 2 Implementation’, FSA Annual Public Meeting, 15 July 2004, available at
http://www.fsa/gov/uk/Pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2004/SP190.shtml.
93 See Jose Maria Roldan, Presentation of CEBS Report, The New Basel Capital Accord and the Future of the European
Financial System, 21 Apr. 2004, available at http://www.cebs.org/pdfs/Presentation%20CEBS%20report%
2021%20April%202004.PDF.
94 Consultation Paper, CEBS, ‘The Application of the Supervisory Review Process Under Pillar 2’, available
at http://www.cebs.org/pdfs/CEBS%20%20CP%2003%20(SRP).PDF.
95 See http://www.cebs.org/Consultation_papers/CP03_responses.htm.
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2005, CEBS began two consultation processes, one on supervisory review that
tackles difficult questions regarding coordination between home and host regula-
tors in supervising transnational financial institutions, and the other regarding
credit-rating agencies in Europe.96 Transnational coordination of supervision
within the EU thus affords additional opportunity for transparency and participation
in the formation of global capital standards and supervisory coordination fostered
by the Basel Committee process.
6 Promoting Accountability and Legitimacy through 
Transnational Processes: The Developing World
Countries outside the G-10 that are not formally part of the Basel Committee also
developed domestic administrative processes regarding implementation of the new
Basel capital standards. The presence of transnational negotiations helped to spur
these countries to develop new administrative procedures to participate more fully
in the Basel Committee’s work. As with administrative procedures in the G-10
nations, the administrative frameworks used in the developing world also tended to
present additional modes to enhance the accountability and legitimacy of the Basel
process.
For example, reformers at the China Banking Regulatory Commission followed
the development of the Basel Committee’s work closely, and commented on the
draft accords.97 After conducting a quantitative impact study and surveying the
competitive landscape, China decided that it would apply Basel II’s second and third
pillar, on supervisory review and market discipline, together with Basel I’s capital
standard, as modified by the Committee.98 China and India decided not to apply
Basel II capital standards to their banks, in reaction, in part, to the US decision to
only apply Basel II to the largest US banking organizations. More importantly, both
countries recognized that their regulatory structures were inadequate to the task of
analysing the complex risk measurement required under the advanced internal-
ratings based approach of the new accord, and that their banks were unlikely to be
able to comply as well.99
By adhering to the Basel I standards, and indicating that they would be moving
towards compliance with the supervisory review standards of Pillar II and the market
96 See Supervisory Review consultation, available at http://www.c-ebs.org/Consultation_papers/CP03-
second.pdf (seeking comment on supervisory review issues), and http://www.c-ebs.org/
Consultation_papers/CP03_feedback.pdf (responding to comments on the first consultation).
97 See Letter from Liu Mingkang, Chairman of the CBRC, to Jaime Caruana, Chairman of the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision, 31 July 2003, available at www.cbrc.gov.cn.
98 See China Banking Regulatory Commission, Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial
Banks, available at http://www.cbrc.gov/cn/english/con_flfg/flfg.jsp?moduleRegID-4&infoLANG=2#.
99 See, e.g., Senior official of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) speaking to the press on
the newly issued Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks (describing the new
rules as ‘the practical choice for China’s banking sector’ and ‘perfectly consistent with the views of the
Basel Committee’), 27 Feb. 2004, available at www.cbrc.gov.cn.
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disclosure standards of Pillar III, China and India kept themselves in the Basel system,
without having to sign on to all the elements of a new accord that would likely not work
for them. Moreover, in the case of China, the decision to adhere to Basel I represented sig-
nificant movement forward from a prior system characterized by regulatory laxity and
little to no transparency. However, failure to adopt Basel II means that Chinese and
Indian banks will need to compete (mostly domestically) with banking organizations
from countries adopting the new accord, and presumably these institutions will be
required to hold lower levels of capital than their Chinese or Indian counterparts. Indeed,
the four major state-owned Chinese banks have already indicated that they plan to
develop the infrastructure and expertise necessary to implement the internal-ratings
based approach despite the Chinese regulatory agency’s position that it is not required.100
China and India found a plausible way to continue to participate in the interna-
tional financial system without adopting in its entirety the new global standard. The
Basel process permits national accountability and legitimacy in decision-making at an
acceptable real world cost. Yet it is ironic that the closed, insular, G-10 process that
gave the world Basel I resulted in widespread adoption of the first accord, while the
inclusive, participatory, and transparent process of Basel II has given us capital stan-
dards that are likely inapplicable to most banks in the developing world.
Similar domestic processes have played out in other developing countries. For
example, Brazil decided to move towards Basel II gradually, focusing first on proper
implementation of the modified Basel I standards together with the Core Principles,
then on Pillar II, followed by Pillar III, and then Pillar I. Pillar I is to be applied only to
the largest domestic and foreign banks operating in Brazil.101 Chile is also moving for-
ward with the standardized approach in the first Pillar, and only later with the
advanced approaches. Chile has developed a roadmap for implementation and
requested comments from industry. Earlier, Chile had requested an external evalua-
tion of its compliance with the Basel Core Principles, and received a 76 per cent rating
in 1999; an IMF/World Bank Review in 2004 found an improvement to 83 per cent,
but the Chilean authorities are looking to make further reforms.102 South Africa,
which has decided to move forward with Basel II for all of its banks, participated in the
Basel process through the non-G10 working groups. In their view, ‘Basel II is suitable
for application in both G10 and non-G10 countries, since it provides a menu of
approaches suitable for both sophisticated and the least sophisticated banks.’103 The
South African Bank Supervision Department promulgated a series of consultation
papers and took comments, established a regular Accord Implementation Forum to
100 See BaselAlert.com, ‘China’s largest banks prepare for Basel II’, Mar. 2005, available at http://db.
riskwaters.com/public/showPage.html?page=20847.
101 See Paulo Sergio Cavalheiro, Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Brazil, remarks, ‘The New Basle Capital
Accord: Regulation of Capital and Financial Stability’, at the conference entitled ‘The New Basel Capital
Accord: Challenges and Opportunities for the Americas’, Mexico City, Mexico, 12–13 July 2004.
102 Enrique Marshall, Superintendent of Banks and Financial Institutions, Chile, ‘Implementation of Basel II
in Developing Countries: The Case of Chile’, at the International Conference on Financial System Stabil-
ity and Implications of Basel II, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 16–18 May 2005.
103 South African Reserve Bank, Bank Supervision Department, Annual Report 2003, at 28.
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discuss Basel II and published transcripts of the meetings, and conducted quantitative
impact studies.104 Similar procedures have been utilized in a wide range of developing
countries considering adoption of Basel II.
Adoption of Basel generally enhanced, or at least did not undermine, accounta-
bility and legitimacy of domestic processes, and domestic processes, in turn, tended
to provide additional opportunities for public participation, transparency, and in
some cases democratic input through legislatures that enhance the accountability
and legitimacy of the international rulemaking process at Basel. Basel II is likely to
be adopted by most countries. A recent survey on non-G-10 countries indicated
that 88 of 107 countries responding intended to adopt Basel II, and that about
77 per cent of bank assets in non-G-10 countries are expected to be covered within
10 years.105 Domestic processes in the wide range of countries involved in adopting
Basel II are an important element of understanding how Basel contributes to the
evolution of global administrative law. Global administrative law is being developed
not just at the level of international rule-making, but also in the interactions
among international rule-makers and domestic administrative mechanisms.
7 Nested Regimes: The Basel Committee and the 
International Financial Architecture
Understanding the role of the Basel process and the appropriate nature of administra-
tive mechanisms that ought to be deployed to enhance its legitimacy and accountabil-
ity requires assessing the relationship between Basel and other international financial
regimes, particularly with respect to developing nations. Basel does not operate on its
own. The process of accession to the WTO financial services agreement and concomi-
tant efforts to ensure liberalization under the agreement, resolution of currency and
debt crises, IMF and World Bank policy prescriptions and lending conditions, all inter-
act with Basel adoption in the developing world. The Basel standards, while voluntary
in principle, are effectively embedded in a range of other policies and market practices
that make adoption in some form or another difficult to resist for developing nations.
Because these other policy and market regimes give added force to the Basel Commit-
tee’s hortatory pronouncements, the extent and nature of global administrative law
mechanisms designed to enhance the legitimacy and accountability of the Basel
Committee’s processes need to take account of these extra-Basel inputs.
Adherence to the Basel principles is increasingly seen as an important element of IMF
and World Bank lending decisions and as an essential element of the new international fin-
ancial architecture.106 IMF teams review countries for policy reforms that reflect adherence
to the Basel Core Principles and have conducted more than 158 such assessments.107 For
104 See generally www.reservebank.co.za.
105 Financial Stability Institute Survey (noted in Marshall, supra note 101).
106 B. Eichengreen, Towards a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda (1999).
107 See, e.g., IMF, Experimental IMF Report on Observance of Standards and Codes: Uganda (Aug. 1999) (evalu-
ating de jure and de facto compliance with the Basel principles on transparency).
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example, a 2004 review in Chile found that its system for consolidated supervision of
financial conglomerates was ‘materially non-compliant’.108 The IMF has conducted a
series of evaluations of its country assessments.109 Moreover, the IMF itself views
these assessments as furthering universal adoption of Basel principles.110 Although
the IMF generally eschews requiring adoption of voluntary codes in its conditionality
agreements, in practice the IMF does require the specific reform steps that in effect
would bring countries into compliance with the Basel Core Principles.111 Moreover,
countries often include adherence to the Basel principles in their letters of intent, the
documents that govern country policy reforms undertaken to obtain IMF funding. A
search of the IMF website revealed more than 30 letters of intent noting that the
country planned to improve compliance with Basel Core Principles as a condition of
IMF lending.112 The World Bank participates in IMF assessments, and the World Bank
uses conditionality, including adherence to international bank standards, in its
Financial Sector Adjustment Loans.113
Adherence to the Basel Core Principles also comes into play in regards to accession
to the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Financial Services
and Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. Basel standards are
involved in several respects. First, developing countries were encouraged to accede to
the financial services understanding in order to get IMF and World Bank assistance in
the wake of the financial crises of the late 1990s and banking sector reforms, includ-
ing adherence to Basel principles, were essential to obtaining external funding.114
108 Enrique Marshall, Superintendent of Banks and Financial Institutions, Chile, ‘Financial Conglomerates
and Bank Stability: The Chilean Case’, at the Fifth Annual International Seminar on Policy Challenges
for the Financial Sector, ‘International Financial Conglomerates—Issues and Challenges’, The World
Bank, IMF, US Federal Reserve Board., Washington, DC, 1 June 2005.
109 The assessments are known as ‘Core Principles Assessments’ and are now usually conducted as part of the
IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Programme. See International Monetary Fund, ‘Experience with Basel
Core Principles Assessments’ (12 Apr. 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/bcore/
exp.htm; IMF, Concluding Remarks by the Acting Chairman of the IMF Executive Board, ‘Experience with
Basel Core Principles Assessments’, Executive Board Meeting 00/48 (5 May 2000), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/mae/bcore/0071.htm; IMF, ‘Implementation of the Basel Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision, Experiences, Influences, and Perspectives’ (23 Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/bcore/2002/092302.pdf; IMF, ‘Financial Sector Regulation: Issues
and Gaps—Background Paper’ (17 Aug. 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/2004/
eng/081704.pdf; IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators (14 May 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/sta/fsi/eng/2003/051403.pdf; IMF, ‘Financial Soundness Indicators, Background Paper’
(14 May 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/2003/051403bp.pdf.
110 See IMF, ‘Financial Sector Regulation: Issues and Gaps—Background Paper’ (17 Aug. 2004), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/2004/eng/081704.pdf, at 41.
111 See IMF, ‘Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programmes—Policy Issues’ (16 Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/nppdr/cond/2001/2001/eng/policy/021601.pdf, at 38.
112 Authors’ calculations. Occasionally, countries use adherence to the Basel Core Principles as an explicit
benchmark for IMF conditionality. See, e.g., Bolivia, Letters of Intent, 2 June 2004 and 20 Sept. 2004,
tables entitled ‘Bolivia: Structural Conditionality for the extension of the Stand-By Arrangement 2004’.
113 See Ward, ‘Is Basel II Voluntary for Developing Countries?’, 7(3) Financial Regulator (2002) 51, at 53.
114 South Korea is a prominent example (see infra), but a number of WTO accession documents explicitly
discuss the Basel standards: see WTO, ‘Accession of the Kyrgyz Republic: Memorandum on the Foreign
Trade Régime’, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/KGZ/3 (23 Aug. 1996), at 49; WTO, ‘Accession of Kazakhstan:
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Second, the financial services accord requires market liberalization and national
treatment, but permits countries to engage in valid ‘prudential measures’ that would
otherwise be inconsistent with the agreement; the scope of such prudential measures
is likely to be circumscribed by adherence to the Basel standards.115 Lastly, financial
market liberalization in accordance with WTO commitments would likely be disas-
trous without corresponding changes in bank regulation and supervision in line with
the Basel principles. In the 1990s, a good number of developing countries got into
deep trouble by liberalizing financial markets when their regulatory structures were
weak.116 Conversely, adherence to Basel principles is well correlated with financial
system strength and market transparency required for financial liberalization.117
These linkages across regimes generate tradeoffs. On the one hand, linking the
Basel regime to IMF and World Bank lending reinforces the importance of coordina-
tion on banking supervision and capital standards and makes it more likely that
countries will opt-in to the system. 
While not without significant concerns about legitimacy, the Basel process can
serve as a counterweight to domestic deficits in accountability and legitimacy, at least
in the sectors affected by Basel. The charge of a ‘democracy deficit’ among interna-
tional institutions, including the Basel Committee, rests on an assumption that
domestic institutions can better protect the interests of citizens; however, in many
countries this is simply not the case. If there is no domestic democracy to defer to,
international institutions may enhance democratic reforms. Although one must be
cautious in justifying external pressures in the name of democracy, in principle, inter-
national institutions can deploy global administrative law to protect citizens from
their own governments when such governments have weak domestic administrative
law and high risk of regulatory capture; promote sound policies in the face of ineffec-
tual governments; promote ‘good’ factions against ‘bad’ factions in domestic fights
over policy reforms; and even promote democratic principles.118
Participation in the global administrative process engendered by the Basel Commit-
tee can serve as a counterweight to weak domestic administrative law protections. Reg-
ulatory harmonization is not always imperialism, if defined in relation to the citizenry
Questions and Replies to the Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Régime’, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/KAZ/6
(3 Feb. 1997), at 43; WTO, ‘Accession of Ukraine: Additional Questions and Replies Addendum’, WTO
Doc. WT/ACC/UKR/24/Add.1 (21 Mar.1997), at 17; WTO, ‘Accession of Jordan: Questions and Replies
on the Memorandum of the Foreign Trade Regime’, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/JOR/9 (4 June 1997), at 38;
WTO, ‘Accession of the Republic of Moldova: Additional Questions and Replies’, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/
MOL/8 (27 Oct. 1997), at 28; WTO, ‘Accession of Vanuatu: Additional Questions and Replies Adden-
dum’, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/VUT/7/Add.2 (13 May 1998).
115 Accord Ward, supra note 112.
116 See, e.g., J. Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties (2003).
117 See, e.g., IMF, ‘Global Monitoring Report 2004: Policies and Actions for Achieving the MDGs and
Related Outcomes: Background Paper’ (16 Apr. 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
pdr/gmr/eng/2004/041604.pdf.
118 Braithwaite, ‘Prospects for Win-Win International Rapprochement of Regulation’, in OECD, Regulatory
Cooperation in an Interdependent World (1994). The OECD tax process is another useful example of such
international efforts promoting domestic reforms.
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rather than governments. For example, Basel played such a role in China (with respect
to implementation of the Basel principles) and in South Korea (with respect to adop-
tion of the Basel principles). China’s banks are carrying large levels of non-performing
loans and prior (non-)supervision of capital ratios have masked this weakness. In
2004, China introduced a new law that incorporated elements of the Basel Core Prin-
ciples for Effective Banking Supervision.119 China’s move to a new bank supervisory
agency to supervise and regulate capital adequacy standards as part of the Basel pro-
cess (and WTO financial services accession) will likely increase transparency in the
system over time. The Basel process gave added weight to reformers within the Chi-
nese government who wanted to see more openness in the banking sector.
In South Korea, the Basel process gave reformers added weight in internal delibera-
tion over whether to move to a more transparent financial sector. Prior to the Asian
financial crises, domestic entrenched interests opposed to financial market liberaliza-
tion and transparency blocked adoption of the Basel principles. With impetus from
the IMF, which effectively teamed with domestic reformers in South Korea to require
adherence to improved banking supervision as a condition of lending, South Korea
moved to improve its financial sector.
Thus, looking across a range of developing countries, the Basel process has in a
number of contexts helped to enhance accountability and legitimacy at the national
level through greater transparency and public participation. At the same time, Basel
has been able to respond to the need for national accountability and legitimacy
through its openness to flexible adaptation by national governments. These national
administrative and legislative procedures, in turn, have helped to reinforce accounta-
bility in the Basel process. In many countries in the developing world, as in the
developed economies, national and international administrative procedures appear
to have been mutually reinforcing. On the other hand, making Basel participation a
de facto requirement of World Bank and IMF lending and financial market liberaliza-
tion under the WTO financial services accords converts Basel from a voluntary stand-
ard-setting body to an entity with real power to impose policy on countries, at least
those from the developing world. Once Basel is converted from voluntary standards to
policy conditionality, the case for lower levels of administrative structure weakens,
and the need for greater accountability and legitimacy enhanced. Developing coun-
tries rightly could demand more transparency, and greater participation, not simply
on consultative groups but in the Basel Committee itself. Reforming the IMF and the
World Bank to take greater account of the concerns of developing countries–itself a
worthy goal–would not obviate the need to ensure that standards developed in the
Basel Committee are themselves developed in a manner that is consistent with
accountability and legitimacy in the developing world. Moreover, even without
explicit linkage through the IMF and World Bank, market participants look to the
Basel standards in making decisions about lending to and investing in banking
119 China Banking Regulatory Commission, Law on Banking Supervision and Regulation; see also China
Banking Regulatory Commission, ‘Setting A New Stage in China’s Banking Supervision and Regulation’,
11 Mar. 2004, available at http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/module/viewinfo.jsp?infoID=530, at 4.
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organizations in the developing world. Market pressures give added impetus to the
Basel standards and reinforce the ways in which the Basel Committee makes deci-
sions that are effectively binding on a wide range of countries that are not formally
part of its structure. As Basel’s norms become increasingly binding on the developing
world calls for more significant measures regarding accountability and legitimacy
will need to be met, by both the Basel Committee and national governments.
8 Conclusion
The city of Basel may have dull bars, but they are a lot livelier than the administrative
process that has increased the transparency, accountability and legitimacy of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Yet this process holds special promise for
the project of Global Administrative Law. The Basel Committee has increased the
transparency of its processes and broadened the circle of the Basel club. It has
improved opportunities for public participation. These measures serve to increase the
accountability and legitimacy of the Basel Committee’s global rule-making.
The Basel process should open up further. We would like to see greater transpar-
ency and wider participation, both by the public at large and by developing coun-
tries.120 But we recognize that such efforts undeniably result in trade-offs. Closed
membership and informality facilitate deal-making among the countries that matter
in the financial world,121 but also contribute to a sense in the developing world of
exclusion from the international financial architecture. Substantively, Basel II stan-
dards, which involved extensive processes to increase public participation, transpar-
ency and developing country input, are paradoxically too complicated for most of the
developing world to implement wholesale; however, the flexibility of national varia-
tion in the Basel process permits countries to comply with Basel I, move towards har-
monization under Basel II gradually, and still not be shut out of world banking as
long as countries take supervision and capital standards seriously.
Exploring the Basel process in depth helps to reveal nascent elements of global
administrative law, which, this article argues, should be seen as occurring at the
intersection and interaction among domestic and international administrative proc-
esses. Notice and comment rule-making in the development of global standards can
help to enhance accountability and legitimacy by improving the transparency of the
work of international regulators, increasing public participation, and giving added
impetus to serious cost-benefit analysis and rationality review. These processes do
not, and need not, occur solely at the international or domestic levels. Just as it is a
mistake to look wholly to domestic law to ensure the accountability and legitimacy of
transnational regulation, so too is it mistaken to look solely to new international
120 For an example of NGO initiatives to encourage transparency and participation, see One World Trust,
Power without Accountability? (2003), at 9–10 (rating BIS the lowest among inter-governmental organi-
sations on membership control and access to information).
121 Cf., e.g., Green, ‘Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: A Comparison
of the International Tax and Trade Regimes’, 23 Yale J Int’l L (1998) 79.
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administrative law for such ends. Rather, it is in the legal process that occurs at the
intersection of these two phenomena that the promise of global administrative law is
most apparent.
The iterative processes of domestic and international administrative review are
mutually reinforcing. National administrative process can improve transparency in
international negotiations and root international rule-making in the norms of par-
ticipating nations. Enmeshing international rule-making in national modes of
administrative law can serve to improve the accountability and legitimacy of inter-
national rules, both with respect to nations and their citizens. At the same time,
international administrative process can help to overcome weaknesses in domestic
oversight and diminish agency costs by enhancing the opportunity for real oversight
and meaningful participation at the domestic level. International administrative law
cannot replace domestic measures of accountability and legitimacy; individuals
would seem ill-advised to rely on vague promises of global administrative law in
exchange for giving up pursuit of the protections of domestic democracy. Yet global
administrative law can act to enhance domestic administrative law and help to
strengthen the hand of reformers seeking to improve transparency.
As the informal ‘club’ model of the Basel Committee, the world trading order, and
other international institutions gives way increasingly to more binding, more formal
structures, the international community will need to find ways to respond to
demands for greater accountability and legitimacy in international rule-making.
There will undoubtedly be losses to efficiency, more difficulty in reaching consensus,
and other costs, but carefully crafted administrative mechanisms that are sensitive to
institutional and normative context can contribute to greater accountability and
legitimacy, both to the nations that make up the international community and to
their citizens. Such trade-offs are worth it, and may even be required, if the current
move towards globalization is to avoid a backlash that makes all of us worse off.
